Abstract
During
the IV to VI centuries, the Christian doctrine of the Trinity was
formulated using primarily three Greek terms: ousía, hypostasis and
prósōpon. Of those, hypostasis is unique for two reasons: first, it
is the only one present in the NT (Heb 1:3), and secondly, it was
used successively in two mutually incompatible senses: in Nicaea as
synonym of, and to provide precision for, ousía, and from the
Cappadocian Fathers onwards as synonym of, and to provide precision
for, prósōpon. In this article I will examine the introduction of
the terms ousía and hypostasis in the Greek philosophical discourse
and the development of their meaning, focusing on the meaning of
hypostasis which was current at the time when Heb 1:3 was written,
the issues at play in the Christian doctrine of the Trinity, and the
use by the Church of the terms ousía, hypostasis and prósōpon to
provide a precise formulation of that doctrine.
Table
of contents
1.
Plato and Aristotle: what is primary ousía?
2.
Enter hypostasis, the original cognate of substantia.
3.
Hebrews 1:3 in a Stoic and Epicurean lexical context.
4.
Trinitarian orthodoxy and the three possible ways to fall from it.
5.
The "one ousía" answer to Arianism, its modalistic and
tritheistic risks, and Nicaea's "one hypostasis" as
prevention of the second.
6.
The three Hypostases formula: appearance, toleration by St.
Athanasius, resistance by St. Jerome, and my argument for it.
7.
The three Hypostases formula: proposal by St. Basil and St. Gregory
of Nyssa and increasingly official Church adoption since 382.
8.
Post-Chalcedon problem A: ambiguity in ousía or in homoousios.
9.
Post-Chalcedon problem B: why is it that Jesus' objective, concrete,
really existing human nature is not a hypostasis?
References
1.
Plato and Aristotle: what is primary ousía?
The
etymological chain of origin of ousía is:
eimí:
to be, to exist (first person singular) [1];
ōn:
present participle of eimí (masculine nominative singular) [2];
oûsa:
feminine nominative singular of ōn [3] = feminine nominative
singular present participle of eimí;
ousíā:
derivative noun of oûsa [4];
ousía:
modern form of ousíā [5].
Deriving
then from the verb "to be", as we can see in [4] ousía
enters the Greek philosophical discourse with Plato, who uses it to
mean the primary, fundamental kind of being, ("prōtē ousíā",
pl. "prôtai ousíai"), with Aristotle afterwards using it
with the same meaning. It is crucial to note that, for both Plato and
Aristotle, ousía does not enter the discourse as a definition but as
a question to be answered: what is the primary, fundamental kind of
being? What is prōtē ousíā?
While
ousía means the same for both Plato and Aristotle as a
question, they provide
completely different answers to that question. Plato's answer is well
known: the Form, which exists in a transcendent world of Forms, is
prōtē ousíā, the primary, real being, of which the particular
objects in the sensible world are just shadows. Against this Platonic
background, Aristotle then provides his own answer in two works,
Categories and Metaphysics, in which, notably, he provides different
answers.
Categories,
part 5 [6]
-
Primary ousía is the individual, particular, concrete entity, of
which species and accidents can be predicated without it being
predicable of or attributable to anything else. This is actually
stated in negative terms: “what is neither in a subject nor said of
a subject”, i.e. the particular subject itself or "hypokeimenon"
[7], literally “that which underlies or lies beneath” the
universals (first of all species and genus) in which it falls and the
accidents which inhere in it.
-
Secondary ousía ("deutérā ousíā", pl. "deúterai
ousíai") is the species (first of all) and the genus to which
the particular subject belongs.
Metaphysics,
book VII/Zeta [8]
-
Primary ousía is the essence of the particular entity, which is its
form, while the particular entity, the composite of form and matter,
is ousía in a derivative sense. (The Aristotelian expression that
the Latins translated as "essentia" is "to ti ên
einai", "the what it was to be", although sometimes he
uses the shorter expression "to ti esti", "the what it
is".)
-
Species and genus are not ousía.
A
question arises at this point: Is for Aristotle the form of a
particular entity a particular or a universal? This, in conjunction
with his statement in Z.13 that no universal is ousía, is the most
disputed issue regarding Aristotle's Metaphysics, and has given rise
to a whole field of Aristotelian exegesis, in which the main lines
are [9] [10]:
-
Forms are not universal, and each particular entity has its own form
which resides in that entity, so that all individuals of a given
species have forms which are identical to one another but numerically
different.
-
Forms are universal, and Z.13 actually does not exclude them as
ousía.
Since
the second line is basically a reversion to Platonism, IMO it is
extremely implausible that it may reflect Aristotle's personal
position.
Summarizing
the answers that Aristotle gives to the question "What is
primary ousía?":
-
Categories: the particular entity or "hypokeimenon", the
subject which underlies all predicates and cannot be predicated of
anything else.
-
Metaphysics: the essence of the particular entity, which is its form,
which may be understood in a particular or a universal sense.
2.
Enter hypostasis, the original cognate of substantia
Etymologically
[1] [2],
hypostasis
= hypó ("under") + stásis ("a standing" =
(hístēmi ("to stand") + -sis, verbal noun suffix)) =
"that which stands under"
is
a direct cognate of [3] [4] [5] [6]:
substantia
= sub ("under") + stans ("standing", present
active participle of stō ("stand")) = "that which
stands under".
According
to [7], the first recorded use of hypostasis as "substance"
was in the book "On the cause of plants" by Aristotle's
successor Theophrastus (c. 371 - c. 287 BC), while the term may have
been introduced in the philosophical discourse either by the Stoic
Poseidonius (c. 135 BC - c. 51 BC) according to some, or by the
Epicurean Demetrius Lacon (fl. late 2nd century BC) according to
others, in both cases with the meaning of objective or concrete
existence or reality. Thus, real entities were said to "have
hypostasis", whereas merely apparent or imaginary entities did
not.
Recalling
at this point that both the Stoic and the Epicurean philosophical
schools were materialistic, the first conceiving the all-pervading
Logos as a subtle fiery aether and the second conceiving reality as
consisting just of atoms and void, it is clear that, to the extent
that they used the term ousía, they would not have used it in the
sense of form understood as universal or even in the sense of form at
all, but in the sense of the individual, particular, concrete entity,
the "hypokeimenon", “that which underlies or lies
beneath”, which clearly overlaps with the meaning of hypostasis.
Therefore, it is clear that for both Stoics and Epicureans the terms
ousía and hypostasis were synonyms, but that was due to the specific
sense in which both schools understood ousía.
Introducing
now the Latins, who were now becoming interested in philosophy, into
the picture:
Since,
per linguistic design, substantia = hypostasis,
and,
per Stoic and Epicurean understanding of ousía, hypostasis = ousía,
then,
for the Latin-speaking Stoic- and Epicurean-dominated culture,
substantia = ousía.
And
that was the law of the philosophical land until the time of
Plotinus.
3.
Hebrews 1:3 in a Stoic and Epicurean lexical context.
The
term "hypostasis" appears in the NT a total of 5 times:
twice in the 2nd Letter to the Corinthians in the figurative sense of
"confidence" in human beings, which either might lead to
disappointment or is of a foolish kind to begin with (2 Cor 9:4;
11:17), twice in the Letter to the Hebrews in the figurative sense of
"assurance" in God, which will never lead to disappointment
(Heb 3:14; 11:1), and once in the Letter to the Hebrews in the proper
sense:
"Who,
being the radiance of his glory and the exact representation of his
hypostasis," (Heb 1:3a).
In
this passage, "Who" refers to the Son in verse 2, and "his"
refers to "ho Theos" in verse 1, an expression which in the
NT, when used without further qualification, refers to God the
Father. The Greek original of "the exact representation of his
hypostasis" is "charaktēr tēs hypostaseōs autou".
In
order to understand correctly Heb 1:3, we must first take into
account the lexical context of the human author at the time of
writing it. As is well known, the Letter to the Hebrews was written
before the destruction of the Second Temple in 70 AD, since it
consistently refers to the sacrificial system of the Mosaic Law as
still ongoing (Heb 8:4-5; 9:7-10,13,25; 10:1-2; 13:11). On the other
hand, it was probably written shortly before 70 AD, since the
exhortation to "Remember your leaders, those who spoke to you
the word of God. Consider the outcome of their way of life, and
imitate their faith." (Heb 13:7) seems to refer either to James,
brother of the Lord, killed in Jerusalem in 62 AD, or to Peter and
Paul, killed in Rome in 64 and 67 AD. Therefore, the Letter was
written in a cultural context in which, for the last 150 years, the
prevalent philosophical schools had been Stoicism and Epicureanism,
both of which, as we saw in the previous section, used the
term hypostasis with the meaning of objective or concrete existence
or reality.
Then
we must note that the very notion of "charaktēr" -
impressed image or copy of something, reproduction, representation
[1] - necessarily implies a numerical distinction between the
original and its charaktēr. Therefore, stating that the Son is "the
charaktēr of the Father's hypostasis" necessarily implies that
the Son is or has a numerically different hypostasis from
that of the Father, irrespective of what hypostasis may mean in
that context.
Taking
these two points in conjunction, Heb 1:3 is saying that the Son is
the exact representation of the objective, concrete reality of the
Father. Therefore, the objective, concrete reality of the
Son is numerically different from that of the Father.
Once
we understand Heb 1:3 this way, we must answer two questions:
3.1.
Is Heb 1:3 consistent with trinitarian orthodoxy, Arianism,
tritheism, or all of them?
The
key to answer this question is to realize that, in orthodox
trinitarian doctrine, the divine nature does not exist in reality
separate from the divine Persons. I.e. the common divine nature,
abstracted from and without the
personal properties, does not have objective, concrete reality. (And
thus, in the philosophical lexicon of 1st century AD, it does not
"have hypostasis".) It is the Father, the Son and the Holy
Spirit Who have objective, concrete reality. (And thus, in the
philosophical lexicon of 1st century AD, "have hypostasis".)
And since the Father is really not the Son, the objective, concrete
reality of the Son (-his hypostasis in the philosophical lexicon of
1st century AD-) is numerically different from that of the Father,
which is precisely the sense of Heb 1:3, as we saw above. Therefore,
Heb 1:3 is consistent with trinitarian orthodoxy.
Note
that if in the framework of trinitarian orthodoxy we want to use the
term hypostasis in a sense consistent with Heb 1:3, we must use it in
the post-Cappadocian sense, because, as we saw above, Heb 1:3
necessarily implies that the Son is or has a numerically different
hypostasis from that of the Father, irrespective of what hypostasis
may mean.
Clearly
Heb 1:3 is also consistent with Arianism and tritheism, which also
posit that the objective, concrete reality of the Son is numerically
different from that of the Father. The only inconsistency of Heb 1:3
is with modalism.
3.2.
What is the correct translation of hypostasis in Heb 1:3?
As
we will see, the choice of Latin-derived words for "his
hypostasis" to convey the original sense of "the objective,
concrete reality of the Father" can no longer, after the
trinitarian debates of the IV century and the settlement of the
theological lexicon, be made independently from the adoption of a
particular theological position. This is because, as we saw above,
Heb 1:3 necessarily implies that the Son is or has a
numerically different hypostasis from that of the Father,
irrespective of what hypostasis may mean.
With this "charaktēr corollary" in mind, let's examine the
options for translating hypostasis.
a.
Substance. While "substantia"
in the 1st century AD was etymologically and semantically equivalent
to "hypostasis", after Tertullian coined the formula "tres
Personae, una Substantia" early in the III century, substantia
came to mean, among Latin-speaking Christians, the single infinite
spirit that the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit have in common.
This meaning of substantia as equivalent to ousía in the Nicene
sense was reinforced by that Council establishing that hypostasis,
the cognate and original equivalent of substantia, was to be
understood as synonym of ousía. Therefore, translating hypostasis in
Heb 1:3 as "substance" after Nicaea has as a consequence,
per the "charaktēr corollary" recalled above, that the
translated text necessarily implies that the Son has a numerically
different substance, i.e. ousía in the Nicene sense, from that of
the Father, which amounts to stating Arianism if the substances are
qualitatively different or tritheism if they are qualitatively
identical.
In
other words, translating hypostasis as substance would be perfect if
we were translating Heb 1:3 into 1st century Latin,
but after the Tertullian-initiated and Nicaea-confirmed understanding
of substantia as ousía in the Nicene sense, it causes the passage to
state either Arianism or tritheism.
b.
Being. This term is ambiguous,
and in principle could convey the original sense of "objective,
concrete reality" as either post-Nicaean notion, ousía or
Person, though it sounds more like the former, with which it is
etymologically related. Therefore, it is in principle compatible with
all theological positions, though it sounds more as Arian or
tritheistic.
c.
Person. This term is fully
consistent with trinitarian orthodoxy (and also with the other
theological positions, since it says nothing about whether the Father
and the Son have the same ousía.) It has two drawbacks: first, it
has no etymological relation with hypostasis, and second, it is not a
general equivalent to hypostasis but only to a hypostasis of a
personal nature.
d.
Subsistence. This term was
invented around 400 by Tyrannius Rufinus (344-411) to convey the
post-Cappadocian meaning of hypostasis, for which the term substantia
was no longer available since its meaning had been settled in Nicaea
as the Latin equivalent of ousía [2] [3]. It was built by taking
substantia and replacing the derivative of the verb stō by the
derivative of the cognate and synonym verb sistō [4] [5]:
substantia
= sub ("under") + stans ("standing", present
active participle of stō ("stand")) = "that which
stands under".
subsistentia
= sub ("under") + sistēns ("standing", present
active participle of sistō ("stand")) = "that which
stands under".
Therefore
translating hypostasis as subsistence is etymologically perfect,
generally valid, and fully consistent with trinitarian orthodoxy (and
also with the other theological positions, just as the case of
person). The drawback is that the word has a completely unrelated
usual meaning in English.
4.
Trinitarian orthodoxy and the three possible ways to fall from it.
I
will state trinitarian orthodoxy by using exclusively statements in
the NT or readily inferred from its text, without using the formulas
in the Pseudo-Athanasian Creed or Quicumque Symbol, because using a
creed composed in the V century (and not by S. Athanasius but in
southern Gaul) would not be appropriate for this historically-focused
work.
To
note, even when for simplicity I will consider only the Father and
the Son, I will always speak about "trinitarian" orthodoxy,
doctrine, etc.
Trinitarian
orthodoxy can be formulated on the basis of 3 sets of NT statements,
each consisting of one primary and several supporting statements:
1.
'yet for us there is one God, the Father,'
(1 Cor 8:6a)
"This
is eternal life, that they may know You, the only true God," (Jn
17:3a)
Jesus
answered, "The foremost [commandment] is, 'Hear this O Israel:
The Lord our God, the Lord is one,'" (Mk 12:29)
[Here
Jesus quoted the Shema: 'Shema
Yisrael, YHWH eloheinu, YHWH echad.'
(Deut 6:4).]
2.
"I and the Father are one." (Jn 10:30)
[If
Jesus was speaking in Hebrew, He probably said "Ani veha'av
echad", ending with echad as in the Shema.]
In
the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word
was God. (Jn 1:1)
whose
are the fathers, and from whom is the Christ according to the flesh,
Who is God over all, blessed forever. Amen. (Rom 9:5)
Who,
existing in the form of God, did not consider to be equal with God
something to be grasped, (Phil 2:6)
No
one has ever seen God. The only begotten God, the One who Is in the
bosom of the Father, He has made Him known. (Jn 1:18)
Plus
5 passages where the Son is referred as "ho Theos" with a
qualification: Mt 1:23; Jn 20:28; Tit 2:13; 2 Pet 1:1; 1 Jn 5:20.
3.
The Son and the Father are really distinct personal subjects.
[While
the above is not an NT statement, it is an unavoidable
straightforward conclusion from many NT statements, such as:]
"You
are My Son, the beloved; in You I am well pleased." (Mk 1:11b)
"For
the Father loves the Son and shows Him all things that He does."
(Jn 5:20a)
"As
the Father knows Me, I also know the Father; and I lay down My life
for the sheep." (Jn 10:15)
"But
that the world may know that I love the Father, and as the Father has
commanded Me, thus I do." (Jn 14:31)
"Now,
Father, glorify Me together with Yourself, with the glory which I had
with You before the world was." (Jn 17:5)
Correspondingly,
there are 3 possible ways to fall from trinitarian orthodoxy, each by
denying one of the statements:
-
Denial that there is one God = tritheism
-
Denial that the Son and the Father are one = Arianism
-
Denial that the Son and the Father are really distinct = modalism or
Sabellianism
Of
those ways to fall, the first to occur historically was modalism
(Sabellius fl. ca. 215), but it was Arianism which presented the
biggest threat to orthodoxy and prompted the Church to elaborate a
precise formulation of trinitarian doctrine. Tritheism, in turn, was
never a significant threat but just a potential accusation by the
enemies of orthodoxy from within and without, for which no room
should be left.
5.
The "one ousía" answer to Arianism, its modalistic and
tritheistic risks, and Nicaea's "one hypostasis" as
prevention of the second.
Since
Arians denied that the Son and the Father were one, they had to
interpret Jesus' words "I
and the Father are one."
(Jn 10:30) in the sense of only moral oneness and not ontological
oneness. To counter that eisegesis, the orthodox sought for the right
word to add to Jn 10:30 to convey unequivocally the sense of
ontological oneness: "I and the Father are one"... what?
We
arrive at the same question from four key statements by Jesus of his
divinity that were not mentioned in the previous section: the 4 times
in which He explicitely applied to Himself the divine Name in the
first person revealed in Ex 3:14: "Ehyeh", "Ego Eimí",
I Am": Jn 8:24,28,58 & 13:19. If each of the Father and the
Son names Himself "Ego Eimí", "I Am", then Each
is a distinct "I" but Both are the same... what?
The
natural answer to that question was the term ousía, which derived
precisely from the verb "eimí", "to be". So, the
initial orthodox answer to the Arian challenge was: the Father and
the Son are one ousía and two prósōpa, one being and two persons.
Now, each term in that answer, ousía and prósōpon, was at risk of
misinterpretation resulting in another heresy.
The
risk of misinterpretation of ousía came from the fact that the
philosophical stage at the beginning of the IV century was very
different from that of around 70 AD when the Letter to the Hebrews
was written. Platonism had come back with Plotinus (204-270) and
Porphyry (234-305), and with it the notions of forms and universals
and therefore the issue of the exact meaning of ousía. Let us recall
from section 1 that ousía had entered the philosophical discourse,
some 700 years before Nicaea, not as a definition but as a question
to be answered, and for which Aristotle had provided two different
answers, one in the Categories and another in the Metaphysics, the
second of which could in turn be interpreted in two different ways:
C:
the individual, particular, concrete subject or "hypokeimenon",
“that which underlies or lies beneath”;
M1:
the essence or form, understood as particular;
M2:
the essence or form, understood as universal.
Each
of these senses of ousía led to a different sense of the statement
that the Father and the Son were "homoousious", "of
the same ousía":
C:
They were the same particular, concrete subject.
M1:
They had the same essence or form, understood as particular.
M2:
They had the same essence or form, understood as universal.
It
is easy to see that, while sense C amounts to modalism, sense M2
amounts to tritheism, since the case would be the same as stating
that three horses have the same essence or form. It was probably to
prevent the risk of understanding ousía as a universal of which
there were multiple instances, or equivalently, of understanding the
expression "of the same ousía" in the sense of only
qualitative identity instead of numerical identity, that the Nicaea
fathers added hypostasis - which, as we saw in section 2, had the
meaning of objective or concrete existence or reality - as synonym of
ousía, anathematizing those who asserted that the Son of God "is
of another hypostasis or ousía" [1] [2]. Since substantia was
originally the cognate and equivalent of hypostasis, making
hypostasis equivalent to ousía (M1) reinforced the Western
understanding of substantia as the Latin equivalent of ousía (M1)
that had begun with Tertullian.
Whereas
the addition of hypostasis as synonym of ousía effectively prevented
the M2 sense of ousía as universal, which leads to tritheism, it in
effect promoted the C sense - which is evident from the etymological
equivalence of hypostasis, literally "that which stands under",
with hypokeimenon - which leads to modalism.
Which
takes us precisely to the risk of misinterpretation of prósōpon,
which came from the fact that it meant "face", "mask"
or "character in a theatrical play" [3]. Thus modalists
could claim that they were in complete agreement with the definition
of Nicaea.
6.
The three Hypostases formula: appearance, toleration by St.
Athanasius, resistance by St. Jerome, and my argument for it.
As
noted in section 3, the use of hypostasis as synonym of ousía, so
that the Father and the Son were said to be "of the same
hypostasis", was inconsistent with the sense of hypostasis in
Heb 1:3, since that passage necessarily implies - from the very
notion of "charaktēr" as impressed image or copy,
reproduction, representation - that the Son is or has a numerically
different hypostasis from that of the Father, irrespective of what
hypostasis may mean.
It
was not this consideration, however, what motivated orthodox
theologians to advocate formulating trinitarian doctrine in terms of
three hypostases, but the realization that using all the terms that
can convey a sense of objective reality - i.e. hypostasis and ousía
- to denote the common being of the Father and the Son amounted to
leaving the door open for modalists to claim that they were in full
agreement with the dogmatic definitions of the Church.
The
notion of three Hypostases had been introduced in Christian theology
by Origen and had been used also by his former student St. Dionysius
of Alexandria. Its first documented use after Nicaea was by (also
Alexandrian) St. Athanasius, in his work "In Illud Omnia",
written probably c. 335 [1] [2]:
"For
the fact of those venerable living creatures [Isa 6:3; Rev 4:8]
offering their praises three times, saying 'Holy, Holy, Holy,' proves
that the three Hypostases are perfect, just as in saying 'Lord,' they
declare the one Ousía."
After
that, the expression was not used again by St. Athanasius, in
deference to the anathema of Nicaea [1], but was used by non-Nicene
bishops, e.g. in the Dedication creed of the council of Antioch of
341 and in a letter by the homoiousian bishop George of Laodicea in
359. But by the time of the Council of Alexandria of 362, presided by
St. Athanasius, the expression was already being used by people
holding homoousian orthodoxy, as attested by the letter to the Church
in Antioch written by that Council, known as "Tomus ad
Antiochenos" [3] [4], which acknowledged that both expressions,
"three hypostases" and "one hypostasis", could
used in a sense consistent with homoousian orthodoxy.
It
is illustrative to read the passages in the Antiochene Tome that
report the reasons stated by the parties using each expression for
their doing so:
The
Antiochene Tome, on the Antiochian party that spoke of three
Hypostases
For
as to those whom some were blaming for speaking of three Hypostases,
on the ground that the phrase is unscriptural and therefore
suspicious, we thought it right indeed to require nothing beyond the
confession of Nicaea, but on account of the contention we made
enquiry of them, whether they meant, like the Arian madmen,
hypostases foreign and strange, and alien in ousía from one another,
and that each hypostasis was divided apart by itself, as is the case
with creatures in general and in particular with those begotten of
men, or like different substances, such as gold, silver, or brass —
or whether, like other heretics, they meant three Beginnings and
three Gods, by speaking of three Hypostases.
They
assured us in reply that they neither meant this nor had ever held
it. But upon our asking them 'what then do you mean by it, or why do
you use such expressions?' they replied, Because they believed in a
Holy Trinity, not a trinity in name only, but existing and subsisting
in truth, 'both a Father truly existing and subsisting, and a Son
truly substantial and subsisting, and a Holy Spirit subsisting and
really existing do we acknowledge,' and that neither had they said
there were three Gods or three beginnings, nor would they at all
tolerate such as said or held so, but that they acknowledged a Holy
Trinity but One Godhead, and one Beginning, and that the Son is
homoousios with the Father, as the fathers said;
The
Antiochene Tome, on the Antiochian party that spoke of one Hypostasis
Having
accepted then these men's interpretation and defense of their
language, we made enquiry of those blamed by them for speaking of one
Hypostasis, whether they use the expression in the sense of
Sabellius, to the negation of the Son and the Holy Spirit, or as
though the Son were non-substantial, or the Holy Spirit impersonal.
But they in their turn assured us that they neither meant this nor
had ever held it, but 'we use the word Hypostasis thinking
it the same thing to say Hypostasis or Ousía;' 'But
we hold that there is one, because the Son is of the Ousía of the
Father, and because of the identity of nature [physeos]. For we
believe that there is one Godhead, and that it has one nature
[physis], and not that there is one nature of the Father, from which
that of the Son and of the Holy Spirit are distinct.'
End
of quotes from the Antiochene Tome.
Note
that the party speaking of one hypostasis mentioned the term
"physis", "nature". Unlike ousía, physis is
used in the NT, in a well-known passage that speaks of "the"
divine nature (2 Pet 1:4), implying that there is one divine nature
common to the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit.
In
stark contrast with St. Athanasius in the Council of Alexandria of
362, St. Jerome, in his epistle 15 to Pope St. Damasus, written in
376 or 377 [5] [6] [7], manifests his deep trouble with the use of
the formula "three hypostases":
St.
Jerome, in his epistle 15 to Pope St. Damasus of 376 or 377
3.
Just now, I am sorry to say, those Arians, the Campenses, are trying
to extort from me, a Roman Christian, their unheard-of formula of
three hypostases. And this, too, after the definition of Nicaea and
the decree of Alexandria, in which the West has joined. Where, I
should like to know, are the apostles of these doctrines? Where is
their Paul, their new doctor of the Gentiles? I ask them what three
hypostases are supposed to mean. They reply three persons subsisting.
I rejoin that this is my belief. They are not satisfied with the
meaning, they demand the term. Surely some secret venom lurks in the
words. "If any man refuse," I cry, "to acknowledge
three hypostases in the sense of three things hypostatized, that is
three persons subsisting, let him be anathema." Yet, because I
do not learn their words, I am counted a heretic. "But, if any
one, understanding by hypostasis ousía ["usian"], deny
that in the three persons there is one hypostasis, he has no part in
Christ." Because this is my confession I, like you, am branded
with the stigma of Sabellianism.
4.
If you think fit enact a decree; and then I shall not hesitate to
speak of three hypostases. Order a new creed to supersede the Nicene;
and then, whether we are Arians or orthodox, one confession will do
for us all. In the whole range of secular learning
hypostasis never means anything but ousía ["usian"]. And
can any one, I ask, be so profane as to speak of three substances?
There is one nature of God and one only; and this, and this alone,
truly is. For that which subsists by itself, it does not have any
other source, but it is his own. All other things, which are created,
although they appear to be, are not. For there was a time when they
were not, and that which once was not may again cease to be. God
alone who is eternal, that is, who has no beginning, truly has name
of essence. Therefore also He says to Moses from the bush, "I am
who I am," and Moses says of Him, "He who is, sent me."
[Ex 3:14] Certainly at that time the angels, the sky, the earth, the
sea all existed: and how the common name of essence God claimed as
properly his own? But because that nature alone is perfect, and in
the three persons the one Deity subsists, which truly is, and is one
nature; whosoever in the name of religion declares that there are
three, that is three hypostases, that is ousíai ["usias"],
is striving really to predicate
three natures of God. And if this is true, why are we severed by
walls from Arius, when in dishonesty we are one with him?
End
of quote from St. Jerome.
Thus,
the reason why an Antiochian party was using the formula "one
hypostasis" in 362, as they explained it to St. Athanasius, and
the reason why St. Jerome was rejecting the formula "three
hypostases" in 376-377, as he explained it to St. Damasus, was
exactly the same: for them, hypostasis meant the same as ousía.
Which was just inaccurate, because as we saw in section 1 and
summarized in section 5 - and will repeat here due to its importance,
at the risk of tiring readers - ousía had entered the philosophical
discourse not as a definition but as a question to be answered, and
for which Aristotle had provided two different answers, one in the
Categories and another in the Metaphysics, the second of which could
in turn be interpreted in two different ways:
C:
the individual, particular, concrete subject or "hypokeimenon",
“that which underlies or lies beneath”;
M1:
the essence or form, understood as particular;
M2:
the essence or form, understood as universal.
Hypostasis,
in turn, means "objective, concrete reality", and is thus
equivalent to only one of the three possible senses of
ousía, the C: the individual,
particular, concrete subject or "hypokeimenon".
It
would seem that in the case of entities of a spiritual nature there
is no real difference between the C and M1 interpretations of ousía,
as these entities are pure forms without matter. And this is
certainly the case of created spiritual beings, i.e. angels. But it
is definitely not the case of the divine nature, because each
of the three divine Persons is numerically the same divine essence or
form as the other Persons, and
yet each Person is a really distinct subject.
Thus,
the Trinity posed a unique, unprecedented challenge to ontology:
-
while in the case of all created entities there is a one-to-one
correspondence between a particular subject and its essence or form,
understood as particular,
-
in the case of the Deity there are three really, objectively distinct
subjects Who are numerically the same divine essence or form.
Therefore,
when we speak of the numerically one divine ousía we are using ousía
in sense M1, which is not the
sense equivalent to hypostasis. Hypostasis, instead, is an
appropriate term for referring to each of the three really,
objectively distinct divine Persons. This, in conjunction with the
statement in Heb 1:3 that the Son is "the charaktēr - impressed
image or copy, reproduction, representation - of the Father's
hypostasis", which necessarily implies that the Son is or has a
numerically different hypostasis from that of the Father, provides an
extremely strong basis for using hypostasis as synonym of divine
Person.
Excursus:
A last-ditch attempt by "one hypostasis" advocate 1H, in
dialogue with "three hypostases" advocate 3H.
1H:
Wait! If "hypokeimenon" is "the subject which
underlies all predicates", wouldn't that be the one divine
ousía?
3H:
Certainly not according to the Lord Jesus or the Apostle John, as
their statements of divine attributes have "ho Theos", i.e.
God the Father, as subject of the copulative statement. Thus:
"No
one is good, except God alone." in Mk 10:18 and Lk 18:19 is
"Oudeis agathos, ei mē heis, ho Theos."
"God
is Spirit" in Jn 4:24 is "Pneuma ho Theos" (in reverse
order just as the last clause in Jn 1:1).
"God
is light" in 1 Jn 1:5 is "ho Theos phōs estin".
"God
is love" in 1 Jn 4:8,16 is "ho Theos agapē estin".
1H
(puzzled): And how is that consistent with consubstantiality?
3H:
Because the Son is all that God the Father is, in a numerical
identity sense, except Father. So whatever is predicated of God the
Father, except being Father, is also predicated of the Son.
End
of excursus.
But
it took time and effort in the IV century for orthodox theologians to
get to see this clearly, and the first decisive steps in this
direction were made by St. Basil of Caesarea and his brother St.
Gregory of Nyssa.
7.
The three Hypostases formula: proposal by St. Basil and St. Gregory
of Nyssa and increasingly official Church adoption since 382.
After
Nicaea, the first orthodox theologian to propose a notion of
hypostasis distinct from that of ousía in a published work was St.
Basil of Caesarea (330-379), and he does it in his epistles 214 (375)
to Count Terentius [1] and 236 (376) to Amphilochius [2]. In both
letters, the main motive for using hypostasis as synonym of Person is
that, if the orthodox keep speaking of one hypostasis, they set the
stage for the Arians to accuse them of Sabellianism (modalism).
St.
Basil, in his epistle 214 (375) to Count Terentius
3.
Consider well, my excellent friend, that the falsifiers of the truth,
who have introduced the Arian schism as an innovation on the sound
faith of the Fathers, advance no other reason for refusing to accept
the pious opinion of the Fathers than the meaning of the homoousion
which they hold in their wickedness, and to the slander of the whole
faith, alleging our contention to be that the Son is consubstantial
in hypostasis. If we give them any opportunity by our being carried
away by men who propound these sentiments and their like, rather from
simplicity than from malevolence, there is nothing to prevent our
giving them an unanswerable ground of argument against ourselves and
confirming the heresy of those whose one end is in all their
utterances about the Church, not so much to establish their own
position as to calumniate mine. What more serious calumny could there
be? What better calculated to disturb the faith of the majority than
that some of us could be shewn to assert that there is one hypostasis
of Father, Son, and Holy Ghost? We distinctly lay down that there is
a difference of Persons; but this statement was anticipated by
Sabellius, who affirms that God is one by hypostasis, but is
described by Scripture in different Persons, according to the
requirements of each individual case; sometimes under the name of
Father, when there is occasion for this Person; sometimes under the
name of Son when there is a descent to human interests or any of the
operations of the oeconomy; and sometimes under the Person of Spirit
when the occasion demands such phraseology. If, then, any among us
are shewn to assert that Father, Son and Holy Ghost are one in
subject ["hypokeimenon"], while we maintain the three
perfect Persons, how shall we escape giving clear and
incontrovertible proof of the truth of what is being asserted about
us?
4.
The non-identity of hypostasis and ousia is, I take it, suggested
even by our western brethren, where, from a suspicion of the
inadequacy of their own language, they have given the word ousia in
the Greek, to the end that any possible difference of meaning might
be preserved in the clear and unconfounded distinction of terms. If
you ask me to state shortly my own view, I shall state that ousia has
the same relation to hypostasis as the common has to the particular
[a]. Every one of us both shares in existence by the common term of
essence (ousia) and by his own properties is such an one and such an
one. In the same manner, in the matter in question, the term ousia is
common, like goodness, or Godhead, or any similar attribute; while
hypostasis is contemplated in the special property of Fatherhood,
Sonship, or the power to sanctify [b]. If then they describe the
Persons as being without hypostasis, the statement is per se absurd;
but if they concede that the Persons exist in real hypostasis, as
they acknowledge, let them so reckon them that the principle of the
homoousion may be preserved in the unity of the Godhead, and that the
doctrine preached may be the recognition of true religion, of Father,
Son, and Holy Ghost, in the perfect and complete hypostasis of each
of the Persons named.
St.
Basil, in his epistle 236 (376) to Amphilochius
6.
The distinction between ousia and hypostasis is the same as that
between the general and the particular [a]; as, for instance, between
the animal and the particular man. Wherefore, in the case of the
Godhead, we confess one essence or substance so as not to give a
variant definition of existence, but we confess a particular
hypostasis, in order that our conception of Father, Son and Holy
Spirit may be without confusion and clear. If we have no distinct
perception of the separate characteristics, namely, fatherhood,
sonship, and sanctification [b], but form our conception of God from
the general idea of existence, we cannot possibly give a sound
account of our faith. We must, therefore, confess the faith by adding
the particular to the common. The Godhead is common; the fatherhood
particular. We must therefore combine the two and say, "I
believe in God the Father." The like course must be pursued in
the confession of the Son; we must combine the particular with the
common and say "I believe in God the Son," so in the case
of the Holy Ghost we must make our utterance conform to the
appellation and say "in God the Holy Ghost." Hence it
results that there is a satisfactory preservation of the unity by the
confession of the one Godhead, while in the distinction of the
individual properties regarded in each there is the confession of the
peculiar properties of the Persons. On the other hand those who
identify essence or substance and hypostasis are compelled to confess
only three Persons ["Prosopa"], and, in their hesitation to
speak of three hypostases, are convicted of failure to avoid the
error of Sabellius, for even Sabellius himself, who in many places
confuses the conception, yet, by asserting that the same hypostasis
changed its form to meet the needs of the moment, does endeavour to
distinguish persons.
End
of quotes from St. Basil.
[a]
The statement that the relation of ousía to hypostasis is the same
as that of the common to the particular is ambiguous, because the
relation of hypostasis to ousía is not the same in the divine
Persons as in created entities. We will come back to this point
later. Let us say now that, while ousía can be understood as
universal (M2) in the case of created entities, it cannot be
understood that way in the case of the Deity, because that amounts to
tritheism.
[b]
St. Basil had not yet come to understand that the personal property
of the Holy Spirit was passive spiration or procession, i.e. that the
Holy Spirit was breathed eternally by the Father and the Son as their
mutual love, irrespective of whether They would create a universe or
not.
St.
Gregory of Nyssa (335-394) devotes his epistle 35 (c. 380) addressed
to his brother Peter - which is often referred to as St. Basil's
epistle 38 to his brother Gregory - to the difference between ousía
and hypostasis. St. Gregory starts by distinguishing between the
common or general and the particular, and provides a definition of
hypostasis [3].
St.
Gregory of Nissa, in his epistle 35 (c. 380) to his own brother Peter
1.
Since many fail to distinguish in the mystic dogmas the ousía, which
is common, from the principle of the hypostases, they fall into
ambivalent notions and think that it makes no difference at all
whether they say "ousía" or "hypostasis".
Consequently some who accept such notions uncritically are happy to
speak of "one hypostasis" in the same breath as "one
ousía", while others who accept three hypostases think that
they are bound by this confession to assert an equal number of
ousíai. For this reason, so that you too may not succumb to similar
notions, I have put together a short treatise for you as a memorandum
on this topic. Now the meaning of the expressions, to put it briefly,
is as follows:
2.
In the whole class of nouns, expressions used for things which are
plural and numerically diverse have a more general sense, as for
example "man". For anyone who employs this noun indicates
the common nature, not limiting it to any particular man known by
such a term. For "man" has no more reference to Peter than
it has to Andrew, John, or James. The commonality of what is
signified extends alike to all ranked under the same name and
requires some further distinction if we are to understand not "man"
in general, but Peter or John.
[...]
3.
This then is what we affirm: what is spoken of individually is
indicated by the expression "hypostasis". For when someone
says "a man", it strikes upon the ear as a somewhat diffuse
concept due to the indefiniteness of its meaning. Though the nature
is indicated, that thing which subsists and is indicated by the noun
individually is not made clear. But if someone says "Paul",
he shows the nature as subsisting in that which is indicated by the
noun.
This
therefore is the "hypo-stasis": not the indefinite notion
of the ousía, which finds no "standing" ["stasis"]
because of the commonality of what is signified, but that conception
which, through the manifest individualities ["idiomata"],
gives standing and circumscription in a particular thing to the
common and uncircumscribed.
[...]
Transpose,
then, to the divine dogmas the same principle of differentiation
which you acknowledge with regard to ousía and hypostasis in our
affairs, and you will not go wrong.
End
of quote from St. Gregory of Nyssa.
Down
in section 6 of the same letter, St. Gregory says:
"But
perhaps someone may think that the account given here of the
hypostasis does not tally with the conception in the apostle's
writing where he says of the Lord that "He is the brightness of
his glory and the charaktēr of his hypostasis" [Heb 1:3]."
After
explaining where the apparent conflict resides, St. Gregory devotes
section 6 trying to solve it. Here I argue that the passage poses no
conflict at all with his account of the hypostasis.
The
starting point is that, just as the hypostasis of the Father is
characterized by fontal plenitude and paternity (i.e. in a
Bonaventuran framework, in which unbegottenness or innascibility is
understood in a positive sense of fontal plenitude, which implies
paternity), so the hypostasis of the Son is characterized by being
the impress of the hypostasis of the Father (Heb 1:3), or in
Johannine terms, by being generated by the Father when He enunciates,
in eternity, his perfect knowledge of Himself, which is why the Son
is called the Word (Jn 1:1).
Thus,
given that being the impress of God Unbegotten implies being God Only
Begotten ("Monogenes Theos" in Jn 1:18), and not being also
Unbegotten, Heb 1:3 does not pose any conflict, real or apparent, to
the notion of hypostasis as the only divine ousía instantiated
according to the corresponding idiomaton or personal property.
In
381, i.e. around one year after Gregory's letter to Peter, the second
Ecumenical Council convened in Constantinople, and the next year, i.e
382, a synod of bishops assembled in that city and sent a Synodical
Letter to Pope Damasus and other Western bishops, which is the first
official (though not ecumenical) Church document speaking of three
Hypostases [4]:
Letter
from the Constantinople Synod of 382 to Pope Damasus
What
we have undergone — persecutions, afflictions, imperial threats,
cruelty from officials, and whatever other trial at the hands of
heretics — we have put up with for the sake of the gospel faith
established by the 318 fathers at Nicaea in Bithynia. You, we and all
who are not bent on subverting the word of the true faith should give
this creed our approval. It is the most ancient and is consistent
with our baptism. It tells us how to believe in the name of the
Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit: believing also, of
course, that the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit have a single
Godhead and power and substance, a dignity deserving the same honour
and a co-eternal sovereignty, in three most perfect
Hypostases, or three perfect Persons.
So there is no place for
Sabellius’s diseased theory in which the hypostases are confused
and thus their proper characteristics destroyed.
End
of quote from the
Constantinople Synod of 382.
In
431 the third Ecumenical Council convened in Ephesus. The third
letter of St. Cyril of Alexandria to Nestorius, which was read at the
council and included in the proceedings, spoke of the Hypostases of
the Word and of the Holy Spirit [5]:
St.
Cyril of Alexandria, in his 3rd letter to Nestorius
All
the expressions, therefore, that occur in the gospels are to be
referred to one Person, the
one enfleshed Hypostasis of the Word.
For
even though the
Spirit exists in his own Hypostasis and
is thought of on his own, as being Spirit and not as Son, even so He
is not alien to the Son.
End
of quote from St. Cyril.
In
451 the fourth Ecumenical Council convened in Chalcedon and
proclaimed a Christological definition which contains all the terms
considered so far: ousía, prosopon, hypostasis, and nature [6] [7]:
Definition
of the Ecumenical Council of
Chalcedon
Following,
therefore, the holy fathers, we all with one voice teach the
confession of one and the same Son, our Lord Jesus Christ:
the
Same perfect in Godhead, the Same perfect in manhood,
truly
God and the Same truly man, of a rational soul and body;
consubstantial
["homoousios"] with the Father as regards the Godhead,
and
the Same consubstantial ["homoousios"] with us as regards
the manhood,
like
us in all things apart from sin,
before
the ages begotten from the Father as regards the Godhead,
and
in the last days the Same, for us and for our salvation, [born] from
Mary, the Virgin Theotokos, as regards the manhood,
one
and the same Christ, Son, Lord, Only-begotten,
acknowledged
in two natures without confusion, without change, without division,
without separation,
-
the difference of the natures being in no way destroyed by the union,
but
rather the distinctive character of each nature being preserved
and
coming together into one
Person ["Prosopon"] and one Hypostasis -
not
parted or divided into two persons ["Prosopa"],
but
one and the same Son, Only-begotten God, Logos, Lord Jesus Christ.
End
of quote from the Council of
Chalcedon.
Finally,
in 553 the fifth Ecumenical Council convened in Constantinople and
proclaimed a series of trinitarian and Christological definitions,
the first of which explicitely identifies ousía with physis and
hypostasis with prosopon [7]:
First
Anathema of the
Constantinople II Ecumenical Council
If
anyone does not confess that the physis or ousía of the Father, of
the Son, and of the Holy Spirit is one, as also the power and the
authority; [if anyone does not confess] a consubstantial
["homoousios"] Trinity, one Godhead worshipped in three
Hypostases or Persons: let him be anathema. For there is one God and
Father from Whom are all things; and one Lord Jesus Christ through
Whom are all things; and one Holy Spirit in Whom are all things.
End
of quote of the
Constantinople II Ecumenical Council.
8.
Post-Chalcedon problem A: ambiguity in ousía or in homoousios.
The
issue addressed in this section is not a problem at all at the
theological level (in contrast with the issue addressed in the next
section), but basically a matter of semantics. I find it worthwhile,
however, since it provides closure to the question with which we
opened the article.
Recalling
(for the last time!) that ousía had entered the philosophical
discourse as a question to be answered, and for which Aristotle had
provided two different answers, one in the Categories and another in
the Metaphysics, the second of which could in turn be interpreted in
two different ways:
C:
the individual, particular, concrete subject or "hypokeimenon",
“that which underlies or lies beneath”;
M1:
the essence or form, understood as particular;
M2:
the essence or form, understood as universal.
it
is clear that, after the proposal on philosophical terminology by St.
Basil and St. Gregory of Nyssa was accepted by the Church, C was no
longer one of the possible meanings of ousía, but became associated
exclusively with hypostasis.
But
after Chalcedon, the question of whether the sense of ousía was M1
or M2 was still open, as can be seen in the definition by Chalcedon
that the Incarnated Logos is "homoousios with the Father as
regards the divinity" and "homoousios with us as regards
the humanity".
Given
that "homoousios" means "of the same ousía", and
that:
-
whereas the Father and the Son are numerically the same one and only
divine Ousía,
-
Jesus and each of us are numerically distinct instances of the human
ousía,
the
statement of the double consubstantiality of the Incarnated Logos
implies either that (solution 1):
-
ousía is meant univocally, in a particular sense (M1) for both the
divine Persons and created entities, and
-
"same ousía" is meant ambiguously, in a numerical identity
sense for the divine Persons and in a qualitative identity sense for
created entities;
or
that (solution 2):
-
ousía is meant ambiguously, in a particular sense (M1) for the
divine Persons and in a universal sense (M2) for created entities,
and
-
"same ousía" is meant univocally, in a numerical identity
sense for both the divine Persons and created entities.
Since
using ousía in a universal sense is Platonism, my personal solution
is 1. In this case, if we wanted to avoid the ambiguity in
"homoousios", we would have to reserve "homoousios",
"consubstantial" for numerical identity and use
"isoousios", "equisubstantial" for qualitative
identity, so that the definition would state "consubstantial
[homoousios] with the Father as regards the divinity" and
"equisubstantial [isooousios] with us as regards the humanity".
Now,
what is the Church's solution for this problem? For the Roman
Catholic Church, we can find out from the definition by the
Ecumenical Council of Trent, session 13, that "by the
consecration of the bread [...], a conversion is made of the whole
substance of the bread into the substance of the body of Christ our
Lord," as clearly in both cases "substance" is meant
in a particular sense.
9.
Post-Chalcedon problem B: why is it that Jesus' objective, concrete,
really existing human nature is not a hypostasis?
Strictly
speaking, this problem is Post-Ephesus, since that Council had
already defined the doctrine of the one hypostasis of Christ,
although in a way less explicit than that of Chalcedon. Quoting from
the Third letter of Cyril to Nestorius, read at the council of
Ephesus and included in its proceedings [1] [2]:
St.
Cyril of Alexandria, in his Third letter to Nestorius
For
we do not divide up the words of our Saviour in the gospels among two
hypostases or persons.
All
the expressions, therefore, that occur in the gospels are to be
referred to one person, the one enfleshed hypostasis of the Word. For
there is one Lord Jesus Christ, according to the scriptures.
II.
If anyone does not confess that the Logos Who is from God the Father
has been united to flesh according to hypostasis, [...] let him be
anathema.
IV.
If anyone distributes between two persons or hypostases the
expressions used either in the gospels or in the apostolic writings,
whether they have been said by the holy writers of Christ, or by Him
of Himself, [...] let him be anathema.
End
of quote of St. Cyril.
The
question of why Jesus' human nature is not a hypostasis could be just
left as a theological mystery, as in fact Cyril did in his Second
letter to Nestorius, also read at the council of Ephesus and included
in its proceedings [2]:
"the
Logos became man by uniting to Himself according to Hypostasis, in an
ineffable and incomprehensible manner, flesh ensouled with rational
soul."
Still,
it is wholly legitimate to try to understand [3] how the two natures
subsist in one hypostasis. As detailed by Pavouris (2001) [2], the
first steps to such an understanding were made by John of Caesarea
aka John the Grammarian (fl 510-520) and by Leontius of Jerusalem
(fl. probably between 538-550). Quoting from [2]:
Pavouris
(2001) [2], on
John the Grammarian
the
Grammarian teaches that the union in Christ was effected 'according
to synthesis'. [...] This union 'according to synthesis' is also
called 'enhypostatic'. This christology of the 'enhypostaton' is the
major contribution of the neo-Chalcedonians to christological
doctrine. The primary meaning of the term is 'union of two or more
ousiai in one hypostasis'. Yet, like Leontius of Jerusalem, the
Grammarian allows for a second meaning, that of true existence. Thus,
he accepts the axiom that all ousiai are 'enhypostatic' as long as
this means that they really exist. Only in this sense does he agree
to call Christ's human ousia 'enhypostatic': in so far as it subsists
in the Logos' one Hypostasis and therefore truly exists.
Pavouris
(2001) [2], on
Leontius of Jerusalem
Leontius
makes absolutely clear that only the divine nature has always had its
own hypostasis. The human nature, however, has never had a hypostasis
of its own. An obvious question is raised by the 'Nestorian': [...]
if having a hypostasis primarily means being real - an assumption
that Leontius accepts - will a human nature without a hypostasis not
be 'anhypostatic', i.e. non existing? Leontius replies that one
should distinguish between
a)
'anhypostaton', i.e. something that does not have a hypostasis at
all,
b)
'idiohypostaton', i.e. something that exists in its own hypostasis,
and
c)
'enhypostaton', i.e. something that subsists in somebody else's
hypostasis on account of their union.
Christ's
human nature is neither 'anhypostatic' nor 'idiohypostatic'; it is
'enhypostatic', that is, it exists in the pre-existent hypostasis of
the Logos. [...] It is not true, says Leontius, that the 'specific
human nature' of Christ preceded its hypostasis. [...] As soon it
came into being the human nature was enhypostasised, not in a
hypostasis of itw own but in the pre-existent hypostasis of the
Logos.
End
of quote from Pavouris (2001)
[2].
This
is as close as one can get to understanding the hypostatic union
without assuming the real distinction between essence and act of
being or existence. To note, even within Thomism the real distinction
is always a postulate, an axiom. Twetten [4], in the best treatment
of this subject that I am aware of, concludes that "All nine of
Aquinas' arguments for the Real Distinction that we have reviewed
seem vulnerable to the Question-Begging Objection. Aquinas seems
never to have been aware of the objection." (p. 80). He then
proposes an argument of his own, based on hylemorphic theory (pp.
85ff). That argument is of no use to me, first because I hold that
hylemorphism is a valid description of entities only when the form in
question is spiritual, such as the human soul, and secondly because I
also hold that the human soul after death is the same person it was
with the body, even though in a diminished state, so that his
argument would not work for me even in the case of human natures.
Assuming
the real distinction between essence and act of being, we can make a
general definition of hypostasis that applies to both divine Persons
and contingent entities and can be used to formulate the dogmas of
trinitarian and christological orthodoxy.
Recalling
that hypostasis meant the individual, particular, concrete, really
existing subject or "hypokeimenon", and adopting the
particular sense of ousía (M1):
ousía
= essence or form in a particular sense
hypostasis
= act of being in a particular mode + ousía
act
of being = {Subsistent Act of Being (one), contingent act of being
(many)}
modes
of the Subsistent Act of Being = {fontal plenitude and paternity,
filiation, passive spiration or procession}
modes
of a contingent act of being = {created} -- or none at all
divine
Ousía (one) = Subsistent Act of Being (one) -- per absolute divine
simplicity
God
the Father = Subsistent Act of Being in fontal plenitude and
paternity mode
The Son, before the Incarnation = Subsistent Act of Being in filiation
mode
The Son, after the Incarnation = Subsistent Act of Being in filiation
mode + Jesus' human ousía
The Holy
Spirit = Subsistent Act of Being in passive spiration or procession
mode
In
contrast:
Peter
= Peter's contingent act of being + Peter's human ousía
Thus:
-
Jesus is not a human person because his human ousía exists by the
Subsistent Act of Being in filiation mode, the Hypostasis of the Son.
-
Peter is a human person because his ousía exists by Peter's
contingent act of being.
Summarizing:
-
In creatures, there is a one-to-one correspondence between created
hypostasis and created ousía in the particular sense (M1).
-
In the Godhead, three Hypostases are one and the same Ousía (in a
numerical identity sense), Each in a different mode.
-
After the Incarnation, the Son is one Hypostasis in two ousíai.
References
Section
1
[1]
https://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/%CE%B5%E1%BC%B0%CE%BC%CE%AF
[2]
https://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/%E1%BD%A4%CE%BD
[3]
https://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/%CE%BF%E1%BD%96%CF%83%CE%B1
[4]
https://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/%CE%BF%E1%BD%90%CF%83%CE%AF%CE%B1
[5]
https://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/%CE%BF%CF%85%CF%83%CE%AF%CE%B1
[6]
Studtmann, Paul, "Aristotle's Categories", The Stanford
Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2017 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.)
https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2017/entries/aristotle-categories/
[7]
https://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/hupokeimenon
[8]
Cohen, S. Marc, "Aristotle's Metaphysics", The Stanford
Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2016 Edition), Edward N. Zalta
(ed.)
https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2016/entries/aristotle-metaphysics/
[9]
Loux, Michael J., "Primary Ousia: an essay on Aristotle's
Metaphysics Z and H", Cornell University Press, 2008.
https://books.google.com/books?id=1DOIpuLnrnIC
[10]
Cohen, S. Marc, "Z.13: Substances and Universals", 2008.
https://faculty.washington.edu/smcohen/433/Z13Lecture.pdf
Section
2
[1]
https://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/%E1%BD%91%CF%80%CF%8C
[2]
https://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/%CF%83%CF%84%CE%AC%CF%83%CE%B9%CF%82
[3]
https://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/substantia
[4]
https://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/sub#Latin
[5]
https://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/stans#Latin
[6]
https://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/sto#Latin
[7]
Ute Possekel, "Evidence of Greek philosophical concepts in the
writings of Ephrem the Syrian", Peeters Publishers, Louvain,
1999.
https://books.google.com/books?id=rZ3gGQuJUS4C
Section
3
[1]
https://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/%CF%87%CE%B1%CF%81%CE%B1%CE%BA%CF%84%CE%AE%CF%81
[2]
Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange, O.P., The Trinity and God the Creator: A
Commentary on St. Thomas' Theological Summa, Ia, q. 27-119, 1943,
translated by Frederic C. Eckhoff, B. Herder Book Co., 1952.
Reprinted by Aeterna Press, 2016.
https://isidore.co/calibre/browse/book/3085
https://www.ewtn.com/library/theology/trinity.htm
https://books.google.com/books?id=yGmkDAAAQBAJ
[3]
"Subsistence." New Catholic Encyclopedia. Retrieved March
18, 2018 from Encyclopedia.com.
http://www.encyclopedia.com/religion/encyclopedias-almanacs-transcripts-and-maps/subsistence
[4]
https://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/subsisto
[5]
https://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/sisto
Section
5
[1]
http://www.earlychurchtexts.com/public/creed_of_nicaea_325.htm
[2]
http://www.fourthcentury.com/urkunde-24/
[3]
https://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/%CF%80%CF%81%CF%8C%CF%83%CF%89%CF%80%CE%BF%CE%BD
Section
6
[1]
Thomas G. Weinandy, Athanasius: A Theological Introduction, Ashgate
Publishing, 2007.
https://books.google.com/books?id=SGOpA_MjSUgC
[2]
https://www.elpenor.org/athanasius/in-illud-omnia.asp?pg=7
[3]
Lewis Ayres, Nicaea and Its Legacy: An Approach to Fourth-Century
Trinitarian Theology, Oxford University Press, Oxford, Oct 28, 2004.
https://books.google.com/books?id=iT4VDAAAQBAJ
[4]
http://www.newadvent.org/fathers/2818.htm
[5]
The Letters of Saint Jerome, Aeterna Press, 2016.
https://books.google.com/books?id=iTwIDAAAQBAJ
[6]
http://www.newadvent.org/fathers/3001015.htm
[7]
http://www.earlychurchtexts.com/main/jerome/jerome_ep_15_tres_hypostases.shtml
For
the quoted passage, I used this Latin text to improve the accuracy of
the English translation in the previous two references.
Section
7
[1]
https://www.elpenor.org/basil/letters-3.asp
[2]
https://www.elpenor.org/basil/letters-3.asp?pg=39
[3]
https://www.scribd.com/document/212698195/Letter-35
[4]
http://www.papalencyclicals.net/councils/ecum02.htm
[5]
http://www.papalencyclicals.net/councils/ecum03.htm
[6]
Richard Price and Michael Gaddis, The acts of the Council of
Chalcedon, Liverpool University Press, 2005.
https://books.google.com/books?id=6IUaOOT1G3UC
[7]
Pavouris, Raphael (2001), The condemnation of the Christology of the
three chapters in its historical and doctrinal context: the
assessment and judgement of Emperor Justinian and the Fifth
Ecumenical Council (553). PhD thesis, University of Glasgow.
http://theses.gla.ac.uk/1503/
Section
9
[1]
http://www.papalencyclicals.net/councils/ecum03.htm
[2]
Pavouris, Raphael (2001), The condemnation of the Christology of the
three chapters in its historical and doctrinal context: the
assessment and judgement of Emperor Justinian and the Fifth
Ecumenical Council (553). PhD thesis, University of Glasgow.
http://theses.gla.ac.uk/1503/
[3]
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fides_quaerens_intellectum
[4]
David B. Twetten, Really distinguishing essence from esse.
Proceedings of the Society for Medieval Logic and Metaphysics, Volume
6, 2006. Pp 57-94.
http://faculty.fordham.edu/klima/SMLM/PSMLM6/PSMLM6.pdf
